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Abstract
This paper investigates the long-run economic relationship between health care ex-
penditure and income in the world using data on 167 countries over the period 1995-2012,
collected from the World Bank data set. The analysis is carried using panel data methods
that allow one to account for unobserved heterogeneity, temporal persistence, and cross-
section dependence in the form of either a common factor model or a spatial process. We
estimate a global measure of income elasticity using all countries in the sample, and for
sub-groups of countries, depending on their geo-political area and income. Our ﬁndings
suggest that at the global level, health care is a necessity rather than a luxury. However,
results vary greatly depending on the sub-sample analysed. Our ﬁndings seem to suggest
that size of income elasticity depends on the position of diﬀerent countries in the global
income distribution, with poorer countries showing higher elasticity.
Keywords: Health Expenditure; Panels; income elasticity; World; Exploring the geog-
raphy of health.
JEL Classiﬁcations: C31; C33; H51.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades aggregate health care expenditure has increased substantially in the US
and in other developed countries, with several studies documenting a rising share of income
spent on health as country per-capita income increases (Kleiman, 1974; Newhouse, 1977; and
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Hall and Jones, 2007). This has put pressure on policy makers and academics to understand
the reasons for the rise in health expenditure, and assess whether it generates signiﬁcant im-
provements in health and life expectancy (Nordhaus, 2002; Murphy and Topel, 2006; Cutler et
al., 2006). Possible factors contributing to excess growth in health care expenditure, namely
the residual growth in health spending after having controlled for growth in an aging popula-
tion and income, are the spread of insurance, supplier-induced demand and defensive medicine,
factor productivity, and technology (Frogner et al., 2011; Chernew and May, 2011).
A voluminous literature has been studying the income elasticity of health expenditure, with
the aim to assess whether this income elasticity is above unity, which implies that health care
is a luxury good, or below unity, indicating its a necessity.1 Determining the size of the income
elasticity has important policy implications for the ﬁnancing and distribution of health care
resources, with greater government involvement in the health care system justiﬁed if health care
is determined to be a necessity (Culyer, 1988). Empirical results shown in the literature vary
and are often conﬂicting in part due to the use of diﬀerent data sets, the level of data aggregation
(Getzen, 2000), and the adoption of diﬀerent econometric methods, which have been evolving
over time. Early studies were characterized by the use of small, mainly cross-sectional data sets,
under the strong, often unrealistic, assumption of homogeneity across countries (e.g., Kleiman,
1974; Newhouse, 1977; and Leu 1986). Later on, researchers used longitudinal data in an
attempt to introduce cross-country heterogeneity in the relationship between health spending
and income (Gerdtham et al. 1992, Hitiris and Posnett 1992). Starting from the late 90s,
the increasing availability of data from a higher number of countries and for longer periods
has enabled researchers to address the issue of spurious relationships between health spending
and income, and study their non-stationary and cointegration properties (e.g. Hansen and
King 1996; Blomqvist and Carter, 1997; Okunade and Karakus, 2001). The more recent years
witnessed the adoption of new methods developed in econometrics, in order to obtain more
realistic models of health expenditure and estimate income elasticity more accurately. Among
others, methods for non-stationary panels with structural breaks (Carrion-i-Sevestre, 2005;
Hartwig, 2008); panels with spatial correlation and/or unobserved common factors (Moscone
and Tosetti, 2010; Baltagi and Moscone, 2010), or estimation techniques for heterogeneous
panels such as panel threshold regression (Chakroun, 2010) have been adopted.
Other factors may explain why there is not yet unanimous consensus on whether to consider
health care as necessity or luxury. For example, it is plausible to expect income elasticity to
change as income level grows; when a country is poor, a lot of goods and services are regarded
by its citizens as luxuries, but when people are rich enough, luxuries may become necessities.
However, the literature on how income elasticity varies as income rises has conﬂicting results
too. Di Matteo (2003) as well as Lopez-Casasnovas and Saez (2007) show that income elasticity
decreases as income grows, while Chen et al. (2009) and Boungnarasy (2011) conclude that
rich countries have a larger income elasticity than poor countries. We refer to Table 1A in the
Supplementary Material for an overview of the most relevant studies on income elasticity of
health care expenditures over the last 40 years.
1For the purpose of our analysis, it is important to observe that the deﬁnitions of necessity and luxury coming
from income elasticity map onto health expenditure elasticities only if health care products are supplied with
perfect product price elasticities.
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Despite the extensive literature on the topic, few studies so far have oﬀered a global per-
spective, using a very large sample of countries. One limitation of these studies is that they
have treated countries under the strong assumptions of homogeneity and cross sectional inde-
pendence. In this paper we use data from the World Bank data set to analyze the association
between health spending and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), for all countries in the world
over the period 1995 to 2012. We carry the analysis both at the global level and by macro-areas
using the United Nations geo-political classiﬁcation and the income classiﬁcation provided by
the World Bank. The aim is to assess what happens to the size of the income elasticity when
moving from richer to poorer countries. Given the signiﬁcant heterogeneity in characteristics of
countries across the world, we adopt a panel data model with heterogeneous slope coeﬃcients,
both at the global level and for macro areas, so that we allocate the otherwise “excess” growth
to diﬀering income-expenditure elasticities. In addition, we allow for country-speciﬁc eﬀects
and time trends, as well as cross section dependence in the form of spatial eﬀects and/or un-
observed common factors possibly correlated with income. The aim is to capture geographical
concentration of unobservable risk factors (for example, smoking, obesity, pollution, etc.) that
may increase the prevalence of disease or injury in the population thus impacting on health
care expenditure (Revelli, 2006; Moscone and Knapp, 2005), as well as unobserved global ef-
fects such as technology or economic shocks that may aﬀect health spending (Okunade and
Murthy, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2013). We will also test the non-stationarity and cointegration
properties of our variables, and examine the extent to which spending is driven by GDP. Our
ﬁndings show that health care is a necessity good worldwide, although income elasticity rises
to one as we move to poorer countries. We suggest that this result may be linked to diﬀer-
ences in health care productivity across countries, the diﬀerent levels of essential health care
needs targeted by the health care systems, and the diﬀerent complexity of various health care
systems. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper that studies income elasticity worldwide,
allowing for heterogeneity in the relationship between health expenditure and income, as well
as for interdependence across countries in health spending.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data oﬀering
a preliminary exploratory analysis; Section 3 introduces the empirical model. Section 4 goes
through the empirical econometric evidence; Section 5 concludes.
2 DATA
Our investigation uses annual data on 167 countries of the world over 18 years, covering the
period 1995 to 2012. We gathered data on per-capita health expenditure and per-capita GDP,
both expressed at constant 2005 PPP prices, and on the percentage of public expenditure
over total health expenditure, from the World Bank Open data set2. Given the signiﬁcant
heterogeneity across countries, and to better analyze income elasticity in diﬀerent areas of the
globe, we carry our analysis both globally and by macro-areas, using both the United Nations
geo-political classiﬁcation and the World Bank income grouping. A list of the countries included
in each group is provided in the appendix (see also Figure 1A in the Supplementary Material).
2http://data.worldbank.org.
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We refer to Frogner et al. (2011) for a description of health systems in industrialized, high
income countries, and Mills (2011, 2014) for an economic analysis of low- and middle-income
countries health systems. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics on the variables involved
in the analysis, both at the global level and for each group of countries. In line with previous
studies by WHO (Poullier et al., 2002), countries with higher per-capita GDP, also have higher
per-capita health spending. This table also provides estimates of the cross-sectionally estimated
income elasticities at the beginning and at the end of the sample period, as well as an estimate
of the impact of GDP (annual) growth on health care spending growth, by weighted Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS), taking the country-level shares of spending as weights. These preliminary
regressions indicate an income elasticity exceeding 1 for the wealthier countries and below 1
for poorer countries. Globally, income elasticity is slightly increased over time, moving from
1.04 in 1995 to 1.15 in 2012, with the largest increment registered for countries in the Western
European and others group (WEOG). That health care is a luxury for industrialized countries
is in line with a consistent body of literature focused mainly on the OECD countries (see Table
1A in the Supplementary Material). This table also shows that fast growing economies tend
to increase their health care spending more than slow growing economies. As also pointed by
Jakovljevic and Getzen (2016), low and middle income countries are likely to become more
relevant contributors to the global health care market in the long-run.
(Table 1)
3 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
Given that our sample covers countries with very diﬀerent health care systems and characteris-
tics, we expect large heterogeneity in income elasticities of diﬀerent areas of the globe, which,
if ignored, may lead to biased estimates (see Blomqvist and Carter (1997)). In addition, an
important characteristic of health expenditure is the presence of cross section dependence in
the data. Strong forms of correlation across countries is likely to arise because countries react
in a similar manner, although it would be of diﬀerent intensity, to external forces and unantici-
pated events such as technological advances, like innovations in diagnostic tools and therapies,
or health shocks, such as epidemics or diseases whose incidence suddenly rises regionally or
worldwide. According to Deaton (2004), globalization has allowed the rapid transmission of
health knowledge and therapies from one rich country to another, leading to a swift conver-
gence of adult mortality rates among the rich of the world. Weak forms of correlation across
countries may also arise because of ﬁnancial aid, like oﬃcial development assistance, given by
governments and other agencies to support developing countries, thus impacting their health
care spending (see, for example Farag et al., 2009).
To incorporate such features into our empirical model, we consider two alternative panel
speciﬁcations for health spending. First, we consider a linear panel with intercept, trend, and
slope coeﬃcients that vary across countries
hit = αi + dit+ β
′
ixit + uit, i = 1, 2, ..., N ; t = 1, 2, ..., T, (1)
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where hit is per-capita health spending in the i
th country at time t, xit is a vector of regressors
including per-capita GDP (yit), αi is a country-speciﬁc eﬀect, dit is a country-speciﬁc time trend
and uit is the error term, which is allowed to be both serially and cross sectionally correlated. To
estimate the above equation we adopt the Mean Group (MG) estimator by Pesaran and Smith
(1995), which corresponds to the mean of country-speciﬁc ordinary least squares coeﬃcients.
Under slope heterogeneity, such estimator has been shown to be robust to serial correlation, as
well as weak cross section dependence, such as spatial correlation, weak common factors, etc.
(see Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011). As an alternative, more general speciﬁcation, we also consider
the following heterogeneous panel with unobserved factor structure for the error term:
hit = αi + dit+ β
′
ixit + γ
′
ift + eit, (2)
where ft is them-dimensional vector of unobserved common eﬀects, withm being the number of
unobserved factors, γi is them-dimensional vector of coeﬃcients associated with them common
factors and the ith unit, and eit is a country-speciﬁc error. In the above speciﬁcation, common
factors are serially correlated and potentially non-stationary, as well as correlated with the
included regressors; the idiosyncratic error, eit, is allowed to be serially correlated over t and
weakly correlated across i (Chudik et al., 2011). Non-stationary unobserved common factors
possibly correlated with the regressors allow for shifts towards a new equilibrium determined
by the income variable.
We estimate the above equation by Common Correlated Eﬀects Mean Group (CCE MG)
estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006), which corresponds to the MG estimator applied to model
(1), augmented with cross section averages of the dependent variable, ht =
1
N
PN
i=1 hit, and
the regressors, xt =
1
N
PN
i=1 xit. Both MG and CCE MG estimators rely on the assumption
of heterogeneous slope coeﬃcients. Hence, later in the paper, we will use the Pesaran and
Yamagata (2008) statistic for slope homogeneity to test this assumption.
When looking at the link between spending and income, one important issue is whether the
stationarity assumption holds for both time series variables. Hence, in this paper we will also
investigate whether the stationarity assumption holds for the time series variables involved in
the analysis, ultimately determining whether there is a long-run equilibrium between health
care expenditure and income.
4 RESULTS
Table 2 shows results from the MG (column A) and CCE Mean Group (column B) estimators
for World, Geopolitical and Income classiﬁcations. Results are reported when income is the
only variable included in the regression (model 1), as well as when public expenditure rate is
added (model 2).
For the world, the MG estimation (model 1) shows an estimate of the coeﬃcient on income
that is roughly 0.84, while when adding the public health expenditure rate, this estimate rises
to 0.87. For the CCE mean group estimates (Models 1 and 2) the GDP elasticity is smaller
than one, 0.78 and 0.73 when including GDP only, or GDP and public expenditure, respec-
tively, suggesting the necessity nature of health care. Looking at the results for the linear time
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trend (t), its estimated coeﬃcient for MG estimation shows a growth in per-capita health care
spending around 2.2-4.4 per cent, depending on the country, with the lowest level for low in-
come, African countries. However, this coeﬃcient becomes insigniﬁcant when accounting for
the factor structure in CCE estimation, which already captures time varying components.
Table 2 also reports the Pesaran (2004) CD statistic and the Pesaran et al. (2008) bias-
adjusted Lagrange Multiplier (LMadj) statistic of cross section dependence on the residuals from
the CCE regression, before (column A) and after having controlled for common factors (column
B). For both CD and LMadj tests the null hypothesis is absence of error cross section dependence,
namelyH0 : E (uitujt) = 0,for all t and i 6= j in equation (1), andH0 : E (eitejt) = 0,for all t and
i 6= j in equation (2). We observe a sizeable reduction of contemporaneous correlation when
passing from MG to CCE MG estimation. In the latter, the Pesaran (2004) CD test statistic
indicate that there is no signiﬁcant long-range cross section dependence left in the residuals,
once one controls for common factors. On the contrary, the LMadj points to the existence of some
cross section dependence left in the residuals, even after controlling for unobserved common
eﬀects. Such result may be explained by some weak correlation left in the data, perhaps linked
to geographical concentration of unobserved risk factors. The table also reports the Pesaran
and Yamagata (2008) b∆hom test of slope homogeneity, having as null hypothesis H0: βi = β for
all i, against the alternative H1 : βi 6= β, for a non-zero fraction of the slope coeﬃcients. This
test points at signiﬁcant heterogeneity in slope coeﬃcients across countries, hence supporting
the validity of mean group estimation with these data, as opposed to homogeneous pooling
techniques.
(Table 2)
Interesting ﬁndings emerge when looking at estimates of income elasticity in diﬀerent groups.
Focusing on Geo-political groups, the income elasticity is signiﬁcantly less than 1 for countries
from WEOG and Asia-Paciﬁc. For WEOG, the estimated income elasticity is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero after controlling for unobserved common factors. These results support the
hypothesis that for these countries health care is a necessity, which conﬁrms other ﬁndings for
developed countries.
In contrast, African and Latin American (GRULAC) countries display a much larger income
elasticity, equal to one when using the MG estimator. However, the estimated coeﬃcient
is smaller than unity when controlling for unobserved common eﬀects. These results point
at health care being a necessity for these countries, although with a larger coeﬃcient than
in wealthier countries. It is important to observe that these ﬁndings are in contrast with
those from simple cross-section OLS regressions presented in Table 1, where health care is
found to be above 1 for wealthier countries and below 1 for poorer countries. However, the
signiﬁcant heterogeneity across countries as well as our heterogeneity tests cast doubt upon
the appropriateness of assuming homogeneity across these countries. Since health expenditure
represents a sizeable proportion of GDP, as a robustness check to the endogeneity problem we
have tried re-estimating all regressions with health expenditure removed from GDP. Results,
both globally and by group of countries, are very similar to those displayed in Table 2 and
hence are not reported.
6
Income elasticities greater than one have been found in previous works for African countries
(Murthy and Okunade, 2009). For example, Jaunky and Khadaroo (2008) also ﬁnd that public
health expenditure is a luxury while private health expenditure is a necessity good. According
to the authors, in the African context, public health is failing to provide adequate basic health
services to the poor majority, but at the same time allows a minority of a few oligarchs to
take advantage of high-tech health services. These results are in line with those in income
classiﬁcation groups. Indeed, wealthier countries, in the high and upper-high income groups,
have smaller, though signiﬁcant, income elasticities than poorer nations. These ﬁndings point
at the position of countries in the global income distribution as a key factor explaining the level
of income elasticity and support earlier empirical results by Zhang (2013) that an increasing
level of wealth has a positive eﬀect on the magnitude of the income elasticity of demand for
health care.
It is important to remark that the MG estimator accounts for persistent diﬀerences across
countries in the regression intercept and in income elasticity, for example due to diﬀerent size of
countries and associated health care spending, and characteristics in their health care system.
However, one limitation of this estimator is that it assigns the same weight to each country-
speciﬁc OLS coeﬃcient, irrespective of the size or amount of spending of the country. As a
robustness check we have modiﬁed this estimator to weigh each country-speciﬁc coeﬃcient for
the share of health spending over total spending (averaged over time). Results conﬁrm the
necessity nature of the health care good at the world level and for higher income countries.
We now focus on estimation of error correction models, again using the MG and CCE
MG estimators, and provide a set of cointegration tests. Table 3 reports the error correction
models attached to the MG and CCE MG estimation. The coeﬃcient attached to hi,t−1 −
βˆyi,t−1 measures the speed of adjustment of health care spending to a deviation from the long-
run equilibrium relation between expenditure and its determinants. For all estimators, the
coeﬃcient of the error correction term has the expected negative sign. However, the CCE MG
estimator reveals a speed of adjustment of -1.3, much higher than that assessed by the MG
(-0.8).
The table also reports the panel cointegration tests by Westerlund (2007) for the world.
These tests are able to accommodate serially correlated error terms, country-speciﬁc intercepts,
trends, and slope parameters. In Column B, the bootstrap approach has been applied to obtain
p-values robust to cross sectional dependence. The Gτ and Gα statistics test the null hypothesis
of no cointegration for all cross-sectional units against the alternative that there is cointegration
for at least one cross-sectional unit,while the Pτ and Pα test statistics pool information over all
the cross-sectional units to test the null of no cointegration for all cross-sectional units against
the alternative of cointegration for all cross-sectional units. Our tests carried at the global level
provide evidence of cointegration for the panel as a whole. These results are conﬁrmed when
we use bootstrapped p-values to allow for cross-section dependence (column B).
These results are conﬁrmed in the geo-political and income classiﬁcations. Estimates also
show a positive, signiﬁcant coeﬃcient attached to ∆yit, indicating that health spending reacts
to short-run variations in GDP. However, it is interesting to observe that the reaction of wealth-
ier countries to short-run changes in income is much smaller than that of poorer countries, with
a coeﬃcient attached to ∆yit rising from 0.1 for High income to 1.05 for Low income coun-
7
tries. Such result may be explained by the fact that Western countries have highly regulated
and complex health care systems, that reduce their capacity to promptly adjust their health
spending to short-run variations in GDP. These health care systems are designed to satisfy the
essential needs of the population, with the aim to gradually improve its health outcomes. On
the contrary, health care systems in poorer countries struggle to provide basic health care to
the poor majority, thus overall failing to meet the essential health care needs of the population.
Cointegration tests for diﬀerent geographical areas conﬁrm ﬁndings at a global level. Due to
space constraints cointegration tests at the level of macro-area have not been included in this
table but are reported in Tables 5A and 6A of the Supplementary Material.
(Table 3)
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main objective of this empirical exercise has been to study the association between health
care spending and income, using a large data set on heath indicators for 167 countries observed
for eighteen years. Diﬀerent from the existing literature that focuses mainly on OECD countries,
we have oﬀered a global perspective, providing new evidence on developing and low income areas
of the world. The marked diﬀerences of health care systems and needs of the population across
countries poses many challenges to modelling the demand of health care. To deal with these
issues, we have adopted recently developed advanced econometric techniques for large panel
data, to account for unobserved global shocks and heterogeneity. Our results show that when
moving from wealthier to poorer countries, income elasticity rises to around unity, either if we
use geo-political or income level groups (Zhang, 2013). Higher short-run coeﬃcients attached
to GDP for poorer countries are also observed. One reason for the higher income elasticity in
poorer geographic areas is linked to what is regarded as "essential" in health care. This is likely
to depend on the context and the level of richness of nations, with many goods and services
that turn from luxury to necessity as incomes rises. Health care systems in wealthier countries
are set to a relatively high standard of needs, having as ultimate aim the increase of the life
expectancy and well being of citizens. On the contrary, health care systems in many low and
middle income countries do not have a clear understanding of their national health priorities,
with health care provision historically shaped around acute care due to contingent, emergency
events such as infectious disease outbreaks.
Given the consistent heterogeneity existing across the health care systems in our data, our
empirical results should be taken with caution. Although our econometric model allows one
to account for persistent diﬀerences in countries and is able to control for strong and weak
correlations across countries, there still exists great unexplained variation in per-capita health
care spending.
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6 Appendix
The Countries considered in this study are divided into ﬁve geo-political regional groups according to
United Nations classiﬁcation:3
1. WEOG (Western European and Others Group):Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States.
2. Asia-Paciﬁc: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Solomon Islands,Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambo-
dia, Sri Lanka,China,Cyprus, Fiji, Micronesia, Indonesia,India,Iran, Islamic Rep.,Iraq, Japan,
Jordan,Kyrgyz, Kiribati, Republic,Korea, Rep.,Kuwait,Kazakhstan,Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mon-
golia,Malaysia, Oman, Vanuatu, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Philippines, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore,Thailand, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam,
Samoa, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Rep.
3. Eastern European: Azerbaijan, Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Bul-
garia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Repub-
lic, Moldova, Macedonia, FYR, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia,
Ukraine.
4. GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group): Antigua and Barbuda, Bar-
bados, Bahamas, The Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Suriname,
Paraguay, Peru, Panama, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Venezuela.
5. African: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Benin, Burundi, Chad, Congo Dem Rep., Congo Rep.,
Cameroon, Comoros, Central African Republic, Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Guinea-
Bissau, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Tanza-
nia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Namibia, Swaziland, ,Zambia.
In addition, Countries considered in this study are divided into four groups according to their
income level, using the United Nations classiﬁcation:4
1. High: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, The Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial
Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Ko-
rea Rep., Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Repub-
lic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.
3www.en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_Nations_Regional_Groups&redirect=no
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_geoscheme
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2. Upper-middle: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Hungary, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Lebanon, Macedonia, FYR, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Namibia, Panama, Peru,
Romania, Seychelles, South Africa, St. Lucia, Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Thailand,
Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Venezuela RB.
3. Lower-middle: Armenia, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire,
Djibouti, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, In-
dia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Mauritania, Micronesia, Fed.
Sts., Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Ukraine, Uzbek-
istan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, Rep., Zambia.
4. Low: Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, The, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tan-
zania, Togo, Uganda.
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Health Care Expenditure and GDP and OLS income elasticity 
 
 
     Notes: All variables are expressed in US$, per-capita and at constant 2005 PPP prices. Elasticites have been computed applying 
weighted Ordinary Least Squares to the simple regression hit =α+β yit +εit, using country-specific share of health care spending as 
weights.     (*): Average annual growth in %.   (): In this regression, hit and yit are in first-differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HE GDP HE GDP HE GDP HE* GDP*
Group av.  av. Coef. Std.err. av. av. Coef. Std.err. av. av. growth growth Coef. Std.err.
World 476 9,702 1.042 0.039 1,158 13,129 1.151 0.042 791 11,630 6.421 2.658 0.431 0.041
Income:
   High 1,221 23,500 1.146 0.278 2,874 30,009 1.089 0.167 2,016 27,736 5.939 1.975 0.317 0.078
   Upper-Middle 273 6,542 0.922 0.134 743 10,469 0.853 0.163 463 8,297 7.289 2.591 0.626 0.071
   Low-Middle 92 2,396 0.981 0.146 257 3,658 0.758 0.165 158 2,936 6.747 3.429 0.581 0.088
   Low 36 813 0.778 0.127 77 1,115 0.829 0.225 52 931 5.354 2.398 0.931 0.122
Geo-politics:
   WEOG 1,764 26,617 0.96 0.221 4,231 33,817 1.09 0.174 2,996 31,663 5.339 1.572 0.468 0.081
   Asian-Pacific 328 10,819 0.806 0.062 689 12,908 0.816 0.079 476 11,821 6.727 2.719 -0.109 0.122
   Eastern EU 352 6,853 1.014 0.075 1,145 13,238 0.912 0.089 711 10,114 8.39 4.808 0.614 0.065
   GRULAC 358 7,872 1.026 0.139 832 10,997 0.927 0.106 552 9,486 6.044 2.19 0.548 0.099
   African 97 2,571 0.909 0.048 257 4,187 0.871 0.046 159 3,380 5.339 2.433 0.646 0.086
1995 2012 All years
Elasticity †Elasticity Elasticity
Table 2. Determinants of Health Expenditure for World, Geo-Politics and Income classifications 
 
Notes: Standard errors in paranthese, p-values in square brackets. For both CD and LMadj tests, the null hypothesis is 
absence of error cross section dependence, namely H :E(uit ujt)=0, for all t and i≠j in equation 1, and H :E(uit ujt)=0, for all 
t and i≠j in equation 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Geo-Politics Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
WORLD WEOG
yit 0.837 (0.096) 0.875 (0.095) 0.778 (0.108) 0.729 (0.112) yit 0.691 (0.143) 0.665 (0.147) 0.196 (0.253) 0.142 (0.203)
t 0.03(0.003) 0.03(0.003) -0.001(0.007) -0.001(0.007) t 0.044(0.002) 0.043(0.003) 0.002(0.006) -0.002(0.009)
Publ  it - 0.433 (0.087) - 0.519 (0.109) Publ  it - 0.701 (0.276) 0.075 (0.241)
t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 -1.77 -1.31 -2.12 -2.5 t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 -2.21 -2.31 -3.2 -4.22
CD 22.84 [0.00] 20.59 [0.00] 0.05 [0.96] -0.53 [0.59] CD 17.34 [0.00] 16.76 [0.00] -2.18 [0.03]  -2.04 [0.04]
LMadj 125.4[0.00] 57.54[0.00] 84.02[0.00] 59.42[0.00] LMadj 55.75[0.00] 36.84[0.00] 17.03[0.00]  1.532 [ 0.1255]
3,115.2 [0.00] 3,538.4 [0.00] 916.0 [0.00] 957.4 [0.00]
n. obs 3006 3006 3006 3006 n. obs 432 432 432 432
High Asia-Pacific
yit 0.57 (0.12) 0.62 (0.11) 0.48 (0.17) 0.45 (0.18) yit 0.515 (0.214) 0.505 (0.218) 0.492 (0.248) 0.422 (0.204)
t 0.04(0.004) 0.039(005) -0.001(0.010) 0.001(0.006) t 0.039(0.007) 0.038(0.008) 0.010(0.023) 0.002(0.025)
Publ  it - 0.533 (0.219) 0.47 (0.20) Publ  it 0..555 (0.213) 0.571 (0.195)
t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 -3.58 -3.45 -3.05 -3.05 t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 -2.26 -2.29 -2.048 -2.833
CD 24.34 [0.00] 25.58 [0.00] 2.00 [0.04] 0.96 [0.33] CD 2.37 [0.01] 2.63 [0.00] -1.10 [0.27]  -1.71 [0.08]
LMadj 67.32 [0.00] 39.54 [0.00] 34.27 [0.00] 14.29 [0.00] LMadj 22.00 [0.00]  16.08 [0.00]  5.92 [0.00]  4.965 [0.00]
444.4 [0.00] 535.3 [0.00] 1,658.6 [0.00] 1,828.7 [0.00]
n. obs 918 918 918 918 n. obs 810 810 810 810
Upper-middle Eastern EU
yit 0.60 (0.16) 0.63 (0.18) 0.57 (0.21) 0.65 (0.22) yit 0.984 (0.131) 0.865 (0.103) 0.778 (0.224) 0.830 (0.165)
t 0.04(0.006) 0.04(0.007) -0.007(0.023) 0.003(0.021) t 0.036(0.005) 0.042(0.006) 0.006(0.009) 0.014(0.008)
Publ  it 0.34 (0.14) 0.43 (0.13) Publ  it 0..268 (0.229) 0..191 (0.169)
t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 -2.5 -2.05 -2.04 -1.59 t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 -0.15 -1.31 -0.99 -1.03
CD 2.66 [0.00] 2.97 [0.00] -0.83 [0.40] -0.63 [0.52] CD 6.81 [0.00] 6.56 [0.00] -2.03 [0.04]  -1.89 [0.06]
LMadj 27.32 [0.00] 13.08 [0.00] 18.92 [0.00] 17.55 [0.00] LMadj 23.25 [0.00] 6.74 [0.00] 9.701 [0.00] 2.33 [0.019]
816.2 [0.00] 797.5 [0.00] 196.8 [0.00] 333.5 [0.00]
n. obs 810 810 810 810 n. obs 396 396 396 396
Low-middle GRULAC
yit 1.17 (0.23) 1.22 (0.22) 1.14 (0.27) 0.90 (0.30) yit 1.000 (0.231) 1.330 (0.238) 1.084 (0.339) 1.365 (0.3697)
t '0.037(0.006) 0.034(0.006) 0.009(0.014) 0.008(0.015) t 0.033(0.005) 0.027(0.005) 0.0008(0.013) 0.005(0.014)
Publ  it 0..555 (0.213) 0.61 (0.21) Publ  it 0.533 (0.219) 0.397 (0.163)
t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 0.73 1 0.51 -0.33 t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 0 1.38 0.247 0.98
CD 0.19 [0.84] -0.62 [0.53] -1.29 [0.19] -2.05 [0.04] CD 2.36 [0.02]  0.53 [0.59] -2.12 [0.03] -2.00 [0.04]
LMadj 31.55 [0.00] 19.34 [0.00] 13.73 [0.00] 14.01 [0.00] LMadj 25.76 [0.00] 12.21 [0.00] 17.03 [0.00] 6.186 [0.00]
1634.0 [0.00] 1576.1 [0.00] 802.1 [0.00] 795.5 [0.00]
n. obs 792 792 792 792 n. obs 504 504 504 504
Low African
yit 1.15 (0.24) 1.17 (0.25) 1.00 (0.19) 0.95 (0.21) yit 1.049 (0.206) 1.066 (0.194) 0.936 (0.226) 0.809 (0.176)
t 0.024(0.007) 0.022(0.007) 0.003(0.012) -0.002(0.011) t 0.035(0.006) 0.034(0.006) 0.002(0.013) 0.008(0.014)
Publ  it 0.21 (0.09) 0.23 (0.07) Publ  it 0.202 (0.074) 0.249 (0.074)
t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 0.625 0.68 0 -0.23 t-test for  coeff. of yit =1 0.237 3.4 -0.28 -1.08
CD 5.96 [0.00] 5.52 [0.00] -2.64 [0.00] -1.80 [0.07] CD 3.52 [0.00]  3.49 [0.00] -1.16 [0.24] -1.25 [0.21]
LMadj 14.49 [0.00] 6.99 [0.00] 6.57 [0.00] 10.74 [0.00] LMadj 25.74 [0.00] 12.76 [0.00] 16.05 [0.00] 4.359 [0.00]
2688.0 [0.00] 2910.7 [0.00] 1,042.4 [0.00] 1,473.8 [0.00]
n. obs 486 486 486 486 n. obs 864 864 864 864
(B) CCE MG(A) MG (B) CCE MG (A) MG
 !" hom
 !" hom
 !" hom
 !" hom
 !" hom
 !" hom
 !" hom
 !" hom
 !" hom
 !" hom
Table 3. Error Correction Model for World, Geo-Politics and Income classifications 
 
 
Note: The Gt and Ga statistics test the null hypothesis of no cointegration for all cross-sectional units against the alternative that 
there is cointegration for at least one cross-sectional unit.  
The Pt and Pa test statistics pool information over all the cross-sectional units to test the null of no cointegration for all cross-
sectional units against the alternative of cointegration for all cross-sectional units 
Income Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Geo-Politics Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
WORLD WEOG
-0.813 (0.025) -0.903 (0.027) -1.316 (0.028) -1.353 (0.030) -0.686 (0.059) -0.751 (0.057) -1.023 (0.069) -1.627 (0.113)
Δh i,t-1 0.281 (0.017) 0.255 (0.017) 0.339 (0.021) 0.306 (0.019) Δh i,t-1 0.384 (0.053) 0.347 (0.054) 0.368 (0.057) 0.369 (0.064)
Δyit 0.437 (0.095) 0.467 (0.084) 0.570 (0.100) 0.505 (0.106) Δyit 0.168 (0.110) 0.203 (0.080) 0.133 (0.225) 0.031 (0.168)
Δpubl it - 0..494 (0.083) - 0.471 (0.096) Δpubl it 0.655 (0.202) 0.221 (0.292)
t-test for coeff of yit -1 -6 -6.42 -4.3 -4.71 t-test for coeff of yit -1 -7.56 -9.96 -3.85 -5.76
CD 7.16 [0.00] 4.22 [0.00] -0.10 [0.92] -0.74 [0.45] CD 3.26 [0.00] 4.72 [0.00] -1.89 [0.06] -1.18 [0.24]
LMadj -21.45[0.00] -21.62[0.00] 71.3[0.00] 81.13[0.00] LMadj -1.317[0.18] 0.61[0.54] 7.0[0.00] 9.27[0.00]
Asia-Pacific
-0.74 (0.04) -0.84 (0.04) -1.21 (0.06) -1.42 (0.06) -0.928 (0.052) -1.004 (0.053) -1.454 (0.068) -1.378 (0.064)
Δh i,t-1 0.29 (0.03) 0.25 (0.03) 0.32 (0.04) 0.30 (0.03) Δh i,t-1 0.242 (0.030) 0.222 (0.029) 0.375 (0.041) 0.303 (0.031)
Δyit 0.07 (0.09) 0.25 (0.09) 0.09 (0.20) 0.10 (0.24) Δyit 0.224 (0.224) 0.216 (0.227) 0.480 (0.260) 0.264 (0.200)
Δpubl it 0.69 (0.17) 0.63 (0.20) Δpubl it 0.644 (0.226) 0.721 (0.248)
t-test for coeff of yit -1 -10.33 -8.33 -4.55 -3.75 t-test for coeff of yit -1 -3.46 -3.45 -2 -3.68
CD 4.17[0.00] 6.04[0.00] -0.12[0.90] 0.43[0.66] CD 2.42 [0.01] 1.22 [0.22]  -2.22 [0.03] -1.73 [0.08]
LMadj -4.14[0.00] -2.66[0.00] 9.27 [0.00] 18.26[0.00] LMadj -5.963[0.000]  -5.697[0.000] 9.972[0.000]  19.57[0.000]
-0.87 (0.05) -0.97 (0.05) -1.33 (0.57) -1.47 (0.05) -0.733 (0.065) -0.867 (0.047) -1.142 (0.108) -1.344 (0.078)
Δh i,t-1 0.24 (0.02) 0.24 (0.02) 0.32 (0.03) 0.29 (0.03) Δh i,t-1 0.267 (0.039) 0.242 (0.036) 0.200 (0.043) 0.260 (0.043)
Δyit 0.19 (0.17) 0.24 (0.16) 0.47 (0.20) 0.50 (0.21) Δyit 0.653 (0.106) 0.584 (0.108) 0.625 (0.152) 0.477 (0.179)
Δpubl it 0.51 (0.15) 1.00 (0.54) 0.55 (0.15) Δpubl it 0.318 (0.147) 0.239 (0.166)
t-test for coeff of yit -1 -4.76 -4.76 -2.65 -2.38 t-test for coeff of yit -1 -3.27 -3.85 -2.46 -2.96
CD 1.38[0.16] 0.96 [0.33] -2.20[0.02] -2.12[0.03] CD 1.08 [0.28]  0.31 [0.75] -1.99 [0.04] -0.82 [0.41]
LMadj -8.58[0.00] -10.06 [0.00] 19.20[0.00] 20.06 [0.00] LMadj  -1.47[0.140] -2.108[0.350] 9.092[0.00] 11.32[0.00]
GRULAC
-0.81 (0.05) -0.87(0.06) -1.23 (0.05) -1.37 (0.06) -0.752 (0.065) -0.856 (0.064) -1.262 (0.093) -1.489 (0.096)
Δh i,t-1 0.30 (0.02) 0.27 (0.03) 0.38 (0.02) 0.37 (0.04) Δh i,t-1 0.250 (0.045) 0.204 (0.0448) 0.316 (0.062) 0.263 (0.045)
Δyit 0.71 (0.23) 0.68 (0.21) 0.82 (0.31) 0.56 (0.37) Δyit 0.167 (0.245) 0.577 (0.174) 0.158 (0.346) 0.926 (0.291)
Δpubl it 0.40 (0.17) 0.68 (0.23) Δpubl it 0.684 (0.232) 0.384 (0.134)
t-test for coeff of yit -1 -1.26 -1.52 -0.58 -1.18 t-test for coeff of yit -1 -3.4 -2.47 -2.45 -0.27
CD -0.08[0.93] -0.91[0.36] -0.12[0.90] -0.68[0.49] CD -0.67 [0.50] -0.57 [0.57] -1.28 [0.20] -1.00 [0.31]
LMadj -1.52[0.12] -3.53[0.00] 11.35[0.00] 13.66[0.00] LMadj  -3.524[0.00] -4.192[0.00]  8.636 [0.00] 15.15[0.00]
African
-0.82(0.04) -094 (0.06) -1.28(0.06) -1.33 (0.07) -0.841 (0.044) -0.930 (0.059) -1.293 (0.045) -1.256 (0.067)
Δh i,t-1 0.25 (0.04) 0.24 (0.03) 0.27 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04) Δh i,t-1 0.290 (0.030) 0.276 (0.029) 0.328 (0.040) 0.288 (0.038)
Δyit 1.08 (0.23) 0.87 (0.19) 0.93 (0.18) 1.05 (0.21) Δyit 0.829 (0.189) 0.7158 (0.159) 0.803 (0.205) 0.538 (0.186)
Δpubl it 0.22 (0.07) 0.24 (0.08) Δpubl it 0.242 (0.067) 0.189 (0.098)
t-test for coeff of yit -1 0.34 -0.68 -0.38 0.23 t-test for coeff of yit -1 -0.9 -1.79 -0.96 -2.52
CD 3.20[0.00] 2.11[0.03] -1.89[0.05] -1.55[0.12] CD 1.24 [0.21] 1.03 [0.30] -1.34 [0.18] -2.01 [0.04]
LMadj -2.07[0.03] -4.10[0.00] 7.93[0.00] 9.35[0.00] LMadj -7.059[0.000] -7.946[0.000]  20.8 [0.000] 26.25 [0.000]
Westerlund Gt -2.544 [0.00] -2.684 [ 0.01] -2.544 [0.06] -2.684 [0.10]
cointegration Ga -9.044 [0.100] -7.766 [0.100] -9.044 [0.42] -7.766 [0.12]
tests (WORLD) Pt -48.477 [0.00] -31.83 [0.006] -48.477 [0.00] -31.83 [0.10]
Pa -7.159 [0.00] -8.639 [0.02] -7.159 [0.00] -8.639 [0.00]
Low
(A) MG (B) CCE MG (A) MG (B) CCE MG
High
Upper-middle Eastern EU
Low-middle
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
 ! i ,t-1 -  "# yi ,t-1
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
 
Table 1A. Estimated income elasticity from a variety of studies over the last 60 years 
 
 
Study Time span Key variable Econometric methods Findings
OECD countries
Newhouse (1977) 1970 per-capita HE Cross section regression Income elasticity (range 1.15-1.31)
Leu (1986) 1974 per-capita HE Cross section regression Income elasticity  (1.2)
Parkin, McGuire, and Yule (1987) 1980 per-capita HE in PPPs & HE share of GDP Cross section regression Income elasticity  (0.9)
Gerdtham et al. (1992) 1987 Per capita HE in PPPs Cross section regression Income elasticity  (range 1.39-1.56)
Getzen and Poullier (1992) 1965-1987 Annual percent change of health expenditure Exponential smoothing, moving average and ARIMA methods Income elasticity  (1.39)
Hitiris and Posnett (1992) 1960-1987 Per capita real HE Pooled regression Income elasticity (range 1.02-1.16)
Hansen and King (1996) 1960-1987 real per capita HE Unit root and cointegration analysis Variables are non stationary, absence of cointegration
Blomqvist and Carter (1997) 1960-1991 Per capita HE in PPPs Unit root and cointegration analysis Variables are non stationary, significant heterogeneity
Gerdtham et al. (1998) 1970-1991 Per capita real HE Pooled regression Income elasticity  (range 0.67-0.82)
Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998)  1965-1991 Real per capita HE Pooled regression Income elasticity  (0.77)
Barros (1998) 1960-1990 Growth rate of per capita HE Panel regression analysis Income elasticity  (0.60, 0.92)
Fogel (1999) 1875-1996 Health care expenditure Long run analysis Income elasticity  (1.6)
Roberts (1999) 1960-1993 Real Per capita HE Mean Group, Pooled, Cross section Income elasticity  (range 1.25-2)
Okunade and Karakus (2001) 1960-1997 Real per capita HE Unit root and cointegration analysis Income elastisticity (range 1.20-1.46)
Okunade and Murthy (2002) 1960-1997 Real per capita HE Unit root and cointegration analysis Income elasticity  (1.64)
Freeman (2003) 1966-1998 Health care expenditure Dynamic OLS cointegrating regression Income elasticity  (range 0.81-0.84)
Herwartz and Theilen (2003) 1961-1979 Growth rate of per capita HE Panel regression analysis Income elasticity  (0.74)
Clemente et al (2004) 1960-1977 Public and Private HE Cobb-Douglas utility function Variables are non stationary, significant heterogeneity
Crivelli and al. (2006) 1996-2002 socialised percapita HE Panel regression analysis Income elasticity with negative value (-0.08, -0.11)
Hall and Jones (2007) 1950-2000 HE share of GDP Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) HE shares rise is a rational response to growth of income
Costa-Font and Pons-Novell 1992-1999 Public per capita HE OLS ans MLE Income elasticity  (range 0.66- 0.98)
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2005) 1960-1997 Real per capita HE Unit root with structural break Variables can be characterised as stationary processes evolving around a broken trend
Moscone and Tosetti, 2010 1980-2004 Per capita HE in PPPs Unit root and cointegration analysis (FE, CCE) Income elasticity  (range 0.36-0.90)
Baltagi and Moscone, 2010 1971-2004 Real per capita HE Unit root and cointegration analysis ((FE, CCE, Spatial Model) Income elasticity (range 0.44-0.89)
Darmont et al., 2010 1970-2002 Per-capita HE in PPPs Panel regression analysis Income elasticity (range 0.75-1.59)
Chakroun, 2010 1975-2003 Per-capita HE in PPPs Panel threshold regression Income elasticity below 1
Acemoglu et al. (2013) 1960-2005 Area hospital expenditures IV regression with oil prices as instruments Income elasticity (0.7)
  
Table 1A. continued. 
 
 
Note: Since methodologies vary and elasticities must be interpolated in many cases, readers are cautioned to carefully refer to original sources in the list of references. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asian countries
Boungnarasy (2011) 1975-2006 Real per-capita HE Unit root and cointegration analysis Income elasticity (range 0.36-2.53)
Pan and Liu (2012) 2002-2006 Real per-capita governement HE Panel regression analysis Income elasticity below 1 (range 0.22, 0.40)
Samadi and Rad (2013) 1995-2009 Per capita HE PPPs Panel regression analysis Income elasticity below 1 (0.46, 0.82)
Khan and Mahumud (2015) 1995-2010 Per capita Private and Public HE Panel regression analysis Income elasticity below 1 (range 0.41-0.91)
African countries
Gbesemete, and Gerdtham (1992) 1984 Per-capita HE Cross section regression Income elasticity ( 1.07)
N.R.V. Murthy (2004) 2001 Real per capita HE Cross section regression Income elasticity  (1.11)
Okunade (2005) 1995 Per capita HE in PPPs  Flexible Box-Cox model regression methods and cross section Income elasticity  (0.6)
Jaunky and Khadaroo (2008) 1991-2000 Real per-capita total, private and public HEs Panel regression analysis (FE,GMM,ECM) Income elasticity (range 0.75-1.19)
Murthy and Okunade (2009) 2001 Real per-capita HE Cross section regression Income elasticity (range 1.07-1.11)
Mehara et al (2012) 1995-2005 Per capita HE Unit root and cointegration analysis Income elasticity (0.94)
Lv and Zhu (2014) 1995-2009 Per capita HE Panel regression analysis Income elasticity  (0.98)
World
Xu et al. (2011) 1995-2008 Real per-capita HE Fixed effects static and and dynamic panels Income elasticities (range 0.36-1.30)
Farag et al. (2012) 1995-2006 Real per-capita Government HE Fixed-effect generalized least squares (GLS)  Income elasticity  (range 0.02-0.19)
Liang and Mirelman (2014) 1995-2010 Per capita HE in PPPs Two-stage least squares regression Income elasticity  ( range 0.66-0.94)
Fan and Savedoff (2014) 1995-2009 Per-capita HE Pooled regression in levels and in first-differences Income elasticity (0.7)
  
 
 
 
                                                                                             Table 2A. CIPS panel unit root tests statistics WORLD 
 
                                                                                                                             Notes: (*): significant at the 5 per cent significance level.  
                                                                                                                   See Pesaran (2007) for the exact critical values of the CIPS statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3
hit -2.004* -1.865*  -1.898* -1.805
y it -1.735 -1.697 -1.559 -1.153
Publ  it  -2.187* -1.911*  -1.870* -1.808
Δh i t -3.696* -2.903*  -2.294* -2.411*
Δy i t -3.293* -2.682* -2.059* -2.661*
Δpubl i t -4.078*  -2.664* -2.181* -1.689
With an intercept and trend
hit  -2.625*  -2.607*  -2.425* -2.851*
yit -2.258 -2.372 -2.133  -2.813*
Publ it -2.562* -2.181 -2.146 -1.97
Number of lag
  
 
Table 3A. CIPS panel unit root tests statistics by Income classification 
 
Notes: (*): significant at the 5 per cent significance level. See Pesaran (2007) for the exact critical values of the CIPS statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
hit 0.985 1.107 1.728 0.183 -4.838* -4.894* -4.522* -4.269* -3.129* -4.371* -0.914 0.481 -5.333* -3.873* -1.651 -1.162
y it 3.11 -0.52 -1.03 -2.993 0.668 -0.426 0.464 1.872 0.683 -0.03 2.112 1.564 -0.518 -1.813 -0.482 2.193
Publ  it -0.835 0.087 1.662 3.082  -3.014* -1.382 -2.380* -1.712 -3.226* -2.598 -0.378 -0.365 -2.920* -0.649 0.866 -0.214
Δh it -11.991* -2.107* 0.943 4.305  -15.788* -6.923* -4.120* -2.159*  -12.297* -8.027* -2.759* -1.036 -14.331* -7.008* -3.901* -1.591
Δy it -6.511* -2.131* -0.45 -1.387 -9.863* -5.289* 0.674 1.537 -7.568* -2.973* 0.933 2.625 -8.892* -5.819* -4.531* -0.97
Δpubl it -15.104* -6.544* -2.270* 0.513* -14.449* -4.421* -0.507 0.588 -15.684* -7.853*  -4.337*  -3.281* -13.465* -7.426* 0.901 2.335
hit 3.687 4.574 6.201 7.562 -2.042 -1.449 -1.816 0.157 -0.778  -2.524* 1.605 1.993 -3.784* -3.111* -1.772* 1.042
yit 5.051 1.585 -0.271 0.253 2.444 2.512 4.748 4.717 2.96 1.801 5.483 4.94 -1.772* -2.662* -2.003* 2.247
Publ it 0.27 1.045 2.394 2.941 0.27 1.045 2.394 2.941 -3.102*  -2.497* -2.130* 0.174 -1.162 1.738 4.636 3.821
High Upper-middle Lower-middle Low
Number of lags Number of lags Number of lags
With an intercept and trend
Number of lags
  
 
 
Table 4A. CIPS panel unit root tests statistics by geo-politics classification 
 
Notes: (*): significant at the 5 per cent significance level. See Pesaran (2007) for the exact critical values of the CIPS statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
hit -1.762 -1.654 -1.459 -1.455  -2.227*  -2.292* -1.765 -1.964 -2.694*  -2.217*  -2.604* -2.256* -2.502* -2.364* -1.805 -1.57  -2.439*  -2.315*  -2.122* -1.878
yit -0.908 -1.057 -1.19 -1.532 -1.884 -1.92 -1.761 -1.51  -2.472* -2.508* -2.144* -2.045* -1.224 -1.633 -1.714 -2.102 -1.799 -2.169* -1.71 -1.6
Publit -1.899 -2.185* -1.592 -1.918 -2.023 -1.817 -1.865 -1.689  -2.199* -2.111* -2.355* -2.319* -2.255* -1.884 -1.666 1.314  -2.360*  -2.371*  -2.075* -1.716
Δhit -3.788* -2.631* -1.803 -1.666  -3.900* -2.964* -2.148* -1.591  -4.516*  -2.618* -2.464* -2.216* -4.172* -2.868*  -2.470* -1.961 -4.109*  -2.967*  -2.665* -2.457*
Δy it  -2.840* -2.099* -1.578 -1.654  -2.982* -2.180* -1.879 -1.282 -2.974* -2.686*  -2.192* -1.822  -2.825*  -2.084* -1.536 -1.715 -3.297*  -2.705*  -2.258* -1.73
Δpubl it -3.827*  -2.816*  -2.057* -1.937 -3.687*  -2.398* -1.956* -1.329 -3.935*  -2.944*  -2.240* -2.173* -4.056* -2.669*  -2.288* -1.774  -4.060* -2.881*  -2.220* -1.808
hit -2.398 -1.895 -1.795 1.738 -2.506 -2.565 -1.954 -1.657  -2.799* -2.082*  -2.629* -2.445 -2.648 -2.449 -2.458 -2.199 -2.808* -2.817* -2.684* -2.456
yit -1.812 -1.902 -1.858 -1.986 -2.051 -2.078 -1.98 -1.362 -2.272 -2.635* -2.167 -2.059 -1.203 -1.609 -1.578 -1.93 -1.956 -2.34 -2.087 -1.723
Publ it -2.523 -2.528 -2.085 -1.926 -2.053 -1.867 -1.855 -1.526 -2.579* -2.4 -2.423 -2.245 -2.437 -2.296 -2.444 -1.745 -2.489 -2.597 -2.196 -1.835
With an intercept and trend
GRULAC African
Number of lags Number of lags
WEOG Asia- Pacific Eastern EU
Number of lags Number of lags Number of lags
  
 
 
                                                                        Table 5A. Cointegration test, Income classification 
 
 
 
Income Model 1 Model 2
High Value p-value Value p-value p-value p-value
G t -2.649 0.01 -2.521 0.53 0.63 0.815
G a -9.506 1 -8.654 1 0.625 0.615
P t -19.196 0 -19.725 0 0.44 0.53
P a -10.961 0.01 -10.706 0.41 0.275 0.315
Upper-middle
G t -3.371 0 -2.945 0 0.05 0.525
G a -11.81 0.58 -9.117 1 0.19 0.825
P t -23.953 0 -19.005 0 0.24 0.995
P a -12.439 0 -10.754 0.4 0.36 0.95
Low-middle
G t -2.995 0 -3.217 0 0.175 0.51
G a -10.078 0.97 -4.947 1 0.35 0.715
P t -16.635 0 -14.673 0.71 0.705 0.855
P a -7.86 0.88 -6.259 1 0.78 0.885
Low
G t -2.717 0.01 -3.074 0 0.675 0.34
G a -9.549 0.97 -4.627 1 0.79 0.525
P t -12.474 0.04 -13.556 0.03 0.55 0.915
P a -8.767 0.56 -8.725 0.91 0.47 0.855
Model 1 Model 2
Robust(A) MG
  
                                                                        Table 6A. Cointegration test, Geo-politics classification 
 
Geo-Politics Model 1 Model 2
Value p-value Value p-value p-value p-value
WEOG
G t -2.208 0.83 -2.76 0.09 0.825 0.97
G a -8.11 0.998 -5.075 1 0.79 0.905
P t -9.465 0.844 -11.173 0.52 0.705 0.6
P a -6.715 0.962 -8.326 0.94 0.625 0.28
Asia-Pacific
G t -3.556 0 -3.117 0 0.01 0.36
G a -12.175 0.44 -8.981 1 0.05 0.27
P t -22.187 0 -18.168 0 0.29 0.995
P a -11.946 0 -10.518 0.49 0.345 0.975
Eastern EU
G t -2.81 0.01 -3.352 0 0.59 0.36
G a -8.292 1 -7.946 1 0.865 0.65
P t -10.975 0.11 -13.144 0 0.655 0.475
P a -6.874 0.94 -7.614 0.98 0.78 0.685
GRULAC
G t -3.08 0 -3.27 0 0.225 0.27
G a -11.063 0.77 -7.536 1 0.345 0.625
P t -15.454 0 -15.254 0 0.43 0.515
P a -10.003 0.18 -9.311 0.82 0.505 0.405
African
G t -2.726 0 -2.984 0 0.605 0.675
G a -10.059 0.98 -7.53 1 0.615 0.89
P t -17.481 0 -17.249 0.06 0.525 0.93
P a -9.4 0.3 -8.269 0.99 0.395 0.865
Robust
Model 1 Model 2
(A) MG
  
Figure 1A. Geo-Politics and Income Classification 
 
 
 
References (Table 1A) 
 
Acemoglu D, Finkelstein A, Notowidigdo MJ. 2013. Income and health spending: evidence from oil price shocks. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 95(4): 1079-1095. 
Baltagi BH, Moscone F. 2010. Health care expenditure and income in the OECD reconsidered: Evidence from panel data. Economic Modelling 
27(4): 804-811. 
Barros PP. 1998. The black box of health care expenditure determinants. Health Economics, 7: 533-44 
Blomqvist AG, Carter RAL. 1997. Is health care really a luxury? Journal of Health Economics 16(2): 207-230. 
Boungnarasy M. 2011. Health care expenditures in Asia countries: Panel data analysis. Economics Bulletin 31(4): 3169-3178. 
Carrion-i-Silvestre JL. 2005. Health care expenditure and GDP: are they broken stationary? Journal of Health Economics 24: 839--854. 
Chakroun M. 2010. Health care expenditure and GDP: An international panel smooth transition approach. International Journal of Economics 4(1): 
189-200. 
Clemente J, Marcuello C, Montañés A, Pueyo F. 2004. On the international stability of health care expenditure functions: are government and 
private functions similar?. Journal of Health Economics 23(3): 589-613. 
Costa-Font, J, Pons-Novell J. 2007. Public health expenditure and spatial interactions in a decentralized national health system. Health economics: 
16(3): 291-306. 
Costa-Font J, Gemmill M, Rubert G. 2011. Biases in the healthcare luxury good hypothesis?: a meta-regression analysis. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 174(1): 95-107. 
Crivelli L, Filippini M,  Mosca I. 2006. Federalism and regional health care expenditures: an empirical analysis for the Swiss cantons. Health 
Economics 15(5): 535-541. 
Di Matteo L,  Di Matteo R. 1998. Evidence on the determinants of Canadian provincial government health expenditures: 1965-1991. Journal of 
Health Economics 17(2): 211-228. 
Dormont J, Oliveira MF,  Pelgrin M. 2010. Health expenditures, longevity and growth. In Ageing, Health and Productivity. Edited by  Garibaldi P, 
Oliveira Martins J, and Jan van Ours. Oxford University Press 
Fan VY, Savedoff WD. 2014. The health financing transition: a conceptual framework and empirical evidence. Social science & medicine 105: 112-
121. 
Farag M, Nandakumar AK, Wallack SS, Gaumer G, Hodgkin D. 2009. Does funding from donors displace government spending for health in 
developing countries?. Health Affairs, 28(4): 1045-1055. 
Freeman DG. 2003. Is health care a necessity or a luxury? Pooled estimates of income elasticity from US state-level data. Applied Economics 35(5): 
495-502. 
Fogel RW. 1999. Catching up with the economy. The American Economic Review 89(1): 1-21. 
Gbesemete KP, Gerdtham UG. 1992. Determinants of health care expenditure in Africa: a cross-sectional study. World development, 20(2): 303-
308. 
Getzen, TE, Poullier JP. 1992. International health spending forecasts: concepts and evaluation. Social Science & Medicine 34(9): 1057-1068. 
Gerdtham UG, Sogaard J, Andersson F, Jonsson B. 1992. An econometric analysis of health care expenditure: a cross-section study of the OECD 
countries. Journal of Health Economics 11: 63-84. 
Gerdtham UG, Jönsson B, MacFarlan M, Oxley H. 1998. The determinants of health expenditure in the OECD countries: a pooled data analysis. In 
Health, the medical profession, and regulation (pp. 113-134). Springer US. 
Hall RE, Jones CI. 2007. The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(1): 39-72. 
Hansen P, King A. 1996. The determinants of health care expenditure: a cointegration approach. Journal of Health Economics 15: 127-137. 
Hartwig, J. 2008. What drives health care expenditure? Baumol's model of unbalanced growth revisited. Journal of Health Economics 27: 603-623. 
Herwartz H,  Theilen B. 2003. The determinants of health care expenditure: testing pooling restrictions in small samples. Health Economics, 12(2): 
113-124. 
Hitiris T, Posnett J. 1992. The determinants and effects of health expenditures in developed countries. Journal of Health Economics 11(2): 173-181 
Leu R. 1986. The public--private mix and international health care costs. In: Culyer, A., Jonsson, B. Ž . Eds. , Public and Private Health Services. 
Blackwell, London. 
Lv Z, Zhu H. 2014. Health Care Expenditure and GDP in African Countries: Evidence from Semiparametric Estimation with Panel Data. The 
Scientific World Journal. doi.org/10.1155/2014/905747 
Jaunky VC, Khadaroo AJ. 2008. Health care expenditure and GDP: an African perspective. Applied Econometrics and International Development 
8(1): 131-146. 
Khan JA, Mahumud RA. 2015. Is healthcare a `Necessity'or `Luxury'? an empirical evidence from public and private sector analyses of South-East 
Asian countries?. Health economics review 5(1): 1-9. 
Mehrara M, Fazaeli AA, Fazaeli AA, Fazaeli AR. 2012. The Relationship between Health Expenditures and Economic Growth in Middle East & 
North Africa (MENA) Countries. International Journal of Business Management & Economic Research 3(1): 425-428 
Murthy NRV. 2004. Health care expenditure in Africa: an econometric analysis (anthology section). Atlantic Economic Journal 32(4):358-359 
Moscone F, Knapp M. 2005. Exploring the spatial pattern of mental health expenditure. The Journal of Mental Health Policy and Economics 8: 
205-217. 
Moscone F, Tosetti E. 2010. Health expenditure and income in the United States. Health economics 19(12): 1385-1403. 
Murthy VN, Okunade AA. 2009. The core determinants of health expenditure in the African context: Some econometric evidence for policy. Health 
policy 91(1): 57-62. 
Newhouse JP. 1977. Medical care expenditure: a cross-national survey. Journal of Human Resources 12: 115-125. 
Okunade AA, Karakus MC. 2001. Unit root and cointegration tests: time-series versus panel estimates for international health expenditure models. 
Applied Economics 33: 1131-1137. 
Okunade, AA, Murthy VNR. 2002. Technology as a `major driver' of health care costs: a cointegration analysis of the Newhouse conjecture. 
Journal of Health Economics 21 147-159. 
Okunade, AA. 2005. Analysis and implications of the determinants of healthcare expenditure in African countries. Health Care Management 
Science 8(4): 267-276. 
Pan J, Liu GG. 2012. The determinants of Chinese provincial government health expenditures: evidence from 2002-2006 data. Health economics 
21(7): 757-777. 
Parkin D, McGuire A, Yule B. 1987. Aggregate health care expenditures and national income: is health care a luxury good?. Journal of health 
economics 6(2): 109-127. 
Roberts J. 1999. Sensitivity of elasticity estimates for OECD health care spending: analysis of a dynamic heterogeneous data field. Health 
Economics 8(5): 459-472. 
Samadi A, Rad EH. 2013. Determinants of Healthcare Expenditure in Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Countries: Evidence from Panel 
Cointegration Tests. International journal of health policy and management 1(1): 73-79. 
Xu K, Saksena P, Holly A. 2011. The determinants of health expenditure: a country-level panel data analysis. WHO Working Paper. 
